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Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the appellant, hereby submits the following brief.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of this matter is appropriate in this Court
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and
the Utah Constitution.

Jurisdiction is further appropriate

because this matter involves issues of a Constitutional nature
which is ripe for decision by this Court.

ISSUES PRESENTED

LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
1.

Utah Code Annotated, 78-6-10 (1992) is unconstitutional

in that it violates the Defendants right to seek redress through
the Court system and gives Plaintiffs an unfair advantage by
allowing them the ability to collect monetary damagesf under an
unconstitutional ordinance, simply because they may pick the
forum in which to proceed.
2.

Salt Lake City Ordinances 12.56.530 and 12.56.560 are

unconstitutional in that establish a rule of evidence binding
upon the Court and the City has no real or express power to enact
such ordinances and the Court erred in ruling that Leahy was
liable pursuant these ordinances.
1

3.

An ordinance which creates liability on the basis of

ownership of a car does not provide adequate due process, notice
of wrongdoing sufficient to inform the person to be held liable,
and opportunity to defend or correct and is therefore
constitutionally defective.
Standard of Review
Issues 1, 2 and 3, are legal issues asking the Court to
determine the correctness of the lower Court's legal
determination and this Court must therefore review these issues
under the "correction of error" standard, giving no deference to
the Lower Court's conclusions of law.

(State v. Steward, 806

P.2d 213, (Utah App. 1991); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, (Utah
App. 1991).

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
4.

There was insufficient evidence to find Leahy liable

under 12.56.130.
5. The City of Salt Lake brought action to enforce an
"implied contract" and the Court erred in determining that Leahy
was liable, without evidence that he was the person who entered
into that contract.
6.

The was insufficient evidence of damage to support a

finding of damage to Salt Lake City, in the amount of $7.00.

2

Standard of Review
Issues 4, 5 and 6 are issues relative to evidence before the
lower Court and the interpretation placed upon them and therefore
require this Court to apply the "clearly erroneous" Standard of
Review and give "due regard" to the trial Court's ruling.
Defendant is required to and will "marshall the evidence most
favorable to the lower Court's ruling." (State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d
467, (Utah Ct.App. 1991).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
"No person shall be deprived of live, liberty or
property, without due process of law."
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7
"All courts shall be open, and every person
...shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall be barred from ... defending before
any tribunal, any civil cause to which he is a party."
Utah Constitution. Article I, Section 11

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
".... (2) The appeal to the circuit court is a trial de
novo and shall be tried in accordance with the
procedures of the small claims department, except a
record of the trial shall be maintained. The decision
of the trial de nov may not be appealed unless the
court holds a statute or local ordinance
unconstitutional."
Utah Code Annotated, 78-6-10 1992)

3

" . . .. The judgment of the small claims department ...
is conclusive upon the plaintiff unless a counterclaim
has been interposed. If the defendant is dissatisfied,
he may,... appeal..."
Utah Code Annotated, 78-6-10 (1986)
ORDINANCES
"...B. No person shall park any vehicle in any parking
meter space, ... without immediate depositing in the
parking meter contiguous tot the space such lawful coin
or coins of the United States as are required for such
meter and designated by directions on the meter
C. No person, ... shall permit any vehicle parked
by such person to remain parked in any parking meter
space during any time when the parking meter contiguous
to such space indicates that no portion remains of the
period of which the last previous coin or coins has
been deposited, or beyond the time limited for parking
as designated on the meter."
Salt Lake City Ordinance, 12.56.150
"Whenever any vehicle shall have been parked in
violation of any of the provisions of any ordinance
prohibiting or restricting parking, the person in whose
name such vehicle is registered shall be prima facie
responsible for such violation and subject to the
penalty therefor."
Salt Lake City Ordinance, 12.56.530
"Whenever any vehicle shall have been employed in the
unauthorized use of streets, the person in whose name
such vehicle is registered shall be strictly liable for
such unauthorized use and the penalty therefor."
Salt Lake City Ordinance, 12.56.56

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a civil judgment wherein Leahy was
found liable to Salt Lake City in the amount of $33.00.
4

Leahy is

contesting the constitutionality of city ordinance under which he
was found liable.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The case was originally tried in the Small Claims Division
of the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake City Department on February
26, 1992, finding Appellant (hereinafter "Leahy") liable to the
Defendant in the amount of $118.00 and was appealed to the Third
Circuit Court, due to the unconstitutionality of the ordinance
under which liability was established.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Circuit Court found Leahy liable to the Plaintiff
(hereinafter "Salt Lake City") in the amount of $33.00.

Leahy

appeals again, challenging the constitutionality of the
ordinance, under which he was found liable.

FACTS

1. On or about October 27, 1990, a car was parked in a
metered location.

That car was registered to Leahy, and at some

point the meter expired and was ticketed.
2. Salt Lake City filed a Small Claims Affidavit and Order
on March 11, 1991 and was served upon Leahy on January 11, 1992.
Trial was scheduled for February 26, 1992.
5

This affidavit

specifically stated that Leahy had violated Salt Lake City
Ordinance 12.56.130 and claimed Leahy's liability was imposed
pursuant to Salt Lake city Ordinance 12.56.530, as the registered
owner of the vehicle.
3. Leahy appeared in Small Claims Court and contested the
constitutionality of Salt Lake City Ordinances 12.56.130 and
12.56.530 which were the basis of the Affidavit and Order.
Judgment for Salt Lake City was entered in the amount of $118.00.
4. Leahy appealed the judgment and a Trial de novo was held
in the Circuit Court, Leahy again contested the constitutionality
of the Ordinances and the sufficiency of the evidence against
him.

Salt Lake argued that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.56.560

additionally created liability on Leahy's part.
5.

Judgment was entered against Leahy in the amount of

$33.00, Circuit Court Judge McCleve stating that she believed
that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.56.530 and 12.56.560 imposed a
liability on Leahy and that such ordinances, which applied only a
civil penalty, were constitutionally valid.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Evidence of ownership of a vehicle is not sufficient
evidence of liability under what is in actuality a lawsuit to
enforce an implied contract.

Salt Lake City (hereinafter "the

City") suffered damage only in the amount it was deprived,
6

through failure to deposit coins for whatever period of time the
vehicle was parked there.

The City has no power to enact

ordinances which create a liability based solely on ownership of
the vehicle and such an ordinance, besides being outside of the
City's constitutional and statutory powers, also violates the
constitutional requirements of due process.
The City has chosen the forum in which it wished to proceed
in this matter.

Leahy does not have the same choice.

If it is

true that the ordinances complained of are unconstitutional, the
City gets the benefit of enforcing these same ordinances without,
the Defendants named in such suits, having adequate redress.

ARGUMENT
Utah Code Annotated, 78-6-10 (1992) is unconstitutional
in that it violates the Defendants right to seek
redress through the Court system and gives Plaintiffs
an unfair advantage by allowing them the ability to
collect monetary damagesf under an unconstitutional
ordinance, simply because they may pick the forum in
which to proceed.
The present amendment of this Utah Code has not been tested
in the Courts.

However, the previous version Utah Code

Annotated, 78-6-10 (1986) which prevented the Plaintiff, in a
Small Claims action, from appealing unless a Counterclaim was
interjected, was tested for constitutionality.
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In the case of Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah
1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated that this limitation was not
unconstitutional because:
"..•Plaintiff has the choice of filing his
complaint in the small claims court, the circuit court,
or the district courtf all of which would have
concurrent jurisdiction in this matter..."
The same logic applies in this matterf since the current
statute prevents an appeal from a trial de novo "unless a statute
or ordinance is found to be unconstitutional."
It is difficult to imagine a case in which a challenge to
the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance would be
asserted, in a small claims matter, except as a defense to a
claim.

Therefore, if a statute or ordinance were to be found

unconstitutional, it would it be to the benefit of the defendant
and he would not be likely to appeal.

However, it would be to

the detriment of the Plaintiff and he would be more likely to
appeal causing the Defendant additional expense.
Conversely, should the state or ordinance be, in fact
unconstitutional, the Plaintiff has the added benefit of being
able to collect an unjust award, simply because he choose to
begin in Small Claims Court.

The Defendant, in such

circumstances might wish to originally defend in the Circuit
Court, from which he can seek a constitutional review by the
Court of Appeals, but he has no choice in the matter and redress
becomes impossible•
8

This limitation of the Defendant's right to seek redress
clearly violates the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 11.
In criminal matters, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court
have held that the limitation placed on appeals from trials de
novo from justice courts, pursuant to Utah Rules of Criminal
Proceduref Rule 26(13)(a) is constitutional.

That Rule declares

that the "decision of the circuit court is final except when the
validity or constitutionality of the statute or ordinance is
raised in the justice court." (Monticello v. Christensen, 788
P.2d 513 (Utah 1990), 769 P.2d 853 (Utah Ct.App. 1989).

The

issue in these matters becomes whether or not the Defendant had
raised the constitutionality or validity of the statute or
ordinance.

The same application is required in civil matters in

order to protect the Defendant's rights to due process.
In this case, the Defendant did challenge the
constitutionality of the ordinances imposing liability on him, in
both the lower courts.

(See Transcript, pages 22-24).

The Court

found the ordinances constitutional (See Transcript, pages 2526), and found Leahy liable, based upon those ordinances.
Now, by virtue of Utah Code Annotated, 78-6-10 (1992), Leahy
may be required to pay a judgment entered under an ordinance
which is unconstitutional.

The City obviously picked it's forum

wisely, in order to continue to collect fees under an ordinance
which cannot be challenged in the only Court which can declare it
invalid.

It recognizes that only the appellate Courts can strike
9

it down (See Transcript, page 24), and has the benefit of a
statute which prohibits that very review.
Therefore, this Court should declare Utah Code Annotated,
78-6-10 to be unconstitutional and review the constitutionality
of Salt Lake City Ordinances 12.56.530 and 12.56.560.

Salt Lake City Ordinances 12.56.530 and 12.56.560 are
unconstitutional in that establish a rule of evidence
binding upon the Court and the City has no real or
express power to enact such ordinances and the Court
erred in ruling that Leahy was liable pursuant these
ordinances•
The leading case on the subject of the powers of cities to
pass ordinances is Nasfell v. Oqden, 249 P.2d 507 (Utah 1952).
In that case, the Defendant, in a criminal case for violation of
Ogden's parking ordinances, sought a declaratory judgment
"declaring the presence of a vehicle, parked in violation of any
ordinance, on amy public street in the city, prima facie evidence
that the registered owner of such vehicle committed or authorized
such violation" (emphasis added) was invalid.

The Court did not

distinguish between criminal and civil matters, but stated:
".... Cities in Utah derive their powers through
express legislative grant...
Ogden assumes that because cites have been given
the power to regulate streets and the parking of
vehicles for a fee, together with the powers to enforce
such powers, they necessarily have the implied power to
pass an ordinance establishing a rule of evidence
binding on the courts...Power to pass an ordinance
establishing a rule of evidence binding on the courts
is not granted to cities in express words, nor can it
be fairly implied from, nor is it incident to, the
powers expressly given..."
10

This case has become the accepted law on the subject.

The

only exception the Supreme Court has recognized is that
ordinances can be passed to help enforce ordinances relating to
the health, safety, morals and welfare of it's citizens, under
the police powers granted to the cities by the legislature.
(State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980)
It can not be argued that collecting money on parking
tickets effects the health safety, morals or welfare of it's
citizens either directly or indirectly.

An ordinance which creates liability on the basis of
ownership of a car does not provide adequate due
process, notice of wrongdoing sufficient to inform the
person to be held liable, and opportunity to defend or
correct and is therefore constitutionally defective.
It is well settled law that due process demands that one
have notice and opportunity to defend.

For a statute to declare

that the owner of the vehicle is automatically liable for the
contractual duties the driver has entered into, without having to
prove that the owner was the person who entered the contract,
clearly denies him notice of the contract and opportunity to
defend his position.

Salt Lake City Ordinaces 12.56.530 and

12.56.560 are clearly in violation of the Utah Constitution,
Article 1, Section 7.
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There was insufficient evidence to find Leahy liable
under 12.56.130.
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.56.130 clearly states that "no
person" shall park a vehicle in violation of the parking
ordinances or "allow" that vehicle to remain after the meter has
expired.

The evidence presented at trial did not include a

description or an identification of Defendant as the person who
parked the car or allowed it to remain there past the time
allowed on the meter. (See transcript, pages 9-10).

The City

relied upon the liability established in Salt Lake City
Ordinances 12.56.530 and 12.56.560 in order to establish their
case against Leahy.
The City of Salt Lake brought action to enforce an
"implied contract" and the Court erred in determining
that Leahy was liable, without evidence that he was the
person who entered into that contract.
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, 323 defines an implied
contract as:
"... one inferred from conduct of parties and arises
where plaintiff, without being requested to do so,
renders services under circumstances indicating that he
expects to be paid therefor, and defendant, knowing
such circumstances, avails himself of the benefit of
those services. Chem-Tronix Laboratories, Inc. v.
Solocast Co., A.D., 5 Conn.Cir 533, 258 A.2d 110, 113.
It is an agreement which legitimately can be inferred
from intention of parties as evidenced by circumstance
and ordinary course of dealing and common understanding
of men. Martin v. Little, Brown, & Co., 304 Pa.Super.
424, 450 A.2d 984, 987."
It is commonly understood that one who parks by a meter is
to deposit coins.

Thus the City provides convenient parking
12

spaces for a fee, and one who parks in those spaces is expected
to deposit the fee.

Therefore, whosoever parks at a metered

parking space, enters into an implied contract with the City.
The question becomes, who entered into the space and the
agreement?

The vehicle could not have entered into the

agreement, it is an inanimate object.

The person who parked in

the space would be the party who contracted for services.

If the

vehicle was parked by someone other than the Defendant, it would
be that person who entered the contract.

The City must then

demonstrate that the Leahy knowingly entered into the contract.
They have not done so.

The was insufficient evidence of damage to support a
finding of damage to Salt Lake City, in the amount of
$7.00.
The City's charge for parking in their parking space is 25
cents per half hour, or 50 cents per hour.
that the meter was expired.

There is no argument

The question of damage then must be

established by proving how long the vehicle was parked without
depositing coins and that further, the City could have reasonably
expected to rent that space to someone who would have paid the
appropriate fee.

They might, alternatively, prove that it costs

them x amount of dollars to put overtime notices on the car.

The

City did not produce any such evidence, and relied solely upon
the statement that the "[if] paid within seven days, fine was
$7.00"

without showing any damage.
13

(See transcript, page 7.)

EVIDENCE MARSHALLED
The evidence before the Court was:
1. A vehicle registered to Leahy was parked in a metered
space past the time for which coins had been deposited.
2. The operator of the car was unknown.
3. Salt Lake City Ordinances imposed liability on the owner
of the vehicle.
4. The "fine" for violation of parking ordinances (imposed
by Salt Lake City) is $7.00.
5. Letters had been sent to Leahy, telling him of the
parking violation.
No other evidence was presented to the Court.

This evidence

is clearly insufficient pursuant to Salt Lake City Ordinance
12.56.130.

It does not establish any standard of damage nor does

it prove liability on Leahy's part.

CONCLUSION

Salt Lake City is being wrongfully enriched by virtue of an
uncostitutional statute, and is being aided by the limitation on
the right to appeal from the Small Claims Court.

Salt Lake City

choses the forum to pursue its claimsf establishes the standard
to prove liability and arbitrarily sets the damage amount without
having to prove anything other than the ownership of the car.
Non governmental plaintiff's in civil matters are not given the
same advantages, nor should Salt Lake City.
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WHEREFORE, Leahy moves the Court to reverse the judgment
granted against him in the Small Claims Court by virtue of the
unconstitutionality of the ordinances under which he was found
liable.

DATED this

/%

day of September 1992

Respectfully submitted,

Ronald Scott Leahy
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that FOUR true and correct copies of the foregoing
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